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In	 March	 2014,	 Amnesty	 International	 published	 Injustice	 Incorporated:	
Corporate	 Abuses	 and	 the	 Human	 Rights	 to	 Remedy.1	Injustice	 Incorporated	details	
four	case	studies	described	by	Amnesty	as	“emblematic”	for	the	way	in	which	they	
demonstrate	how	“corporate	political	and	financial	power	intertwined	with	specific	
legal	obstacles	 […]	allow	companies	 to	evade	accountability	and	deny,	or	 severely	
curtail,	 remedy.”2	Injustice	Incorporated	concludes	with	 recommendations	 for	 legal	
reform,	 yet	 does	 not	 call	 for	 a	 “binding	 international	 treaty”	 as	 a	 necessary	






1	AMNESTY	 INTERNATIONAL,	 Injustice	 Incorporated:	 Corporate	 Abuses	 and	 the	 Human	




3	S	 SHETTY,	 ‘Corporations	 have	 rights.	 Now	 we	 need	 a	 global	 treaty	 on	 their	
responsibilities’,	 Amnesty	 International,	 21.01.2015	
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/blogs/2015/01/corporations-have-rights-
now-we-need-a-global-treaty-on-their-responsibilities/>	 accessed	 26.05.17.	 See	
	
Drawing	 upon	 the	 case	 studies	 presented	 in	 Injustice	 Incorporated,	 this	
chapter	 will	 examine	 the	 treaty	 debate	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 international	
environmental	law,	with	attention	to	the	work	of	the	International	Law	Commission.	
Amnesty	 highlights	 that	 the	 chosen	 case	 studies	 have	 in	 common	 a	wide-ranging	






physical	 transfer	 of	 hazardous	 waste.	 Thus,	 all	 involve	 environmental	 harm	with	
associated	violations	of	human	rights.	This	is	important,	as	Ecuador,	a	key	player	in	
the	 push	 toward	 a	 binding	 treaty,	 is	 known	 for	 the	 notorious	 and	 never-ending	
Chevron-Ecuador	 oil	 pollution	 dispute	 –	 another	 environmental	 case.5	Moreover,	
Kiobel,	 the	case	 that	 led	 to	 the	decision	emanating	 from	the	United	State	Supreme	
Court	limiting	the	application	of	the	Alien	Tort	Statute	by	US	courts	due	to	cases	that	
do	not	violate	the	“presumption	against	extraterritoriality”,	may	be	seen	as	arising	
out	 of	 an	 effort	 to	 seek	 justice	 over	 the	 deaths	 of	 environmental	 activists	 voicing	
concerns	 over	 oil	 pollution	 on	 Ogoni	 lands	 in	 Nigeria.6	Indeed,	 it	 is	 increasingly	
common	 to	 hear	 expressions	 of	 concern	 over	 the	 persecution	 of	 “environmental	
rights	 defenders”,	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 self-identify	 as	 indigenous	 peoples.7	Yet	




further	 information	 on	 the	 binding	 treaty	 process,	 <http://business-




4	SL	 SECK,	 ‘Transnational	 Business	 and	Environmental	Harm:	A	TWAIL	Analysis	 of	
Home	State	Obligations’	(2011)	3(1)	Trade,	Law	&	Development	164,	174-76.	
5	See	Resolution	co-sponsored	by	South	Africa	and	Ecuador	on	the	need	for	a	BHR	
treaty	 <http://business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty>	 accessed	 26.05.17.	
See	also	Texaco/Chevron	 lawsuits	 (re	Ecuador),	 as	described	on	 the	Business	and	
Human	 Rights	 Resource	 Centre	 website	 <http://business-
humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador	>	accessed	26.05.17.	
6	SL	 SECK,	 ‘Kiobel	 and	 the	 E-word:	 Reflections	 on	 Transnational	 Environmental	
Responsibility	 in	 an	 Interconnected	World’	 Law	at	the	End	of	the	Day,	 05.07.2013	
<http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.ca/2013/07/sara-seck-on-kiobel-and-e-word.html>	
accessed	26.05.2017.	
7	See,	 for	 example,	 United	 Nations	 Secretary-General,	 Situation	 of	 Human	 Rights	
Defenders,	 UNGA	 68th	 Sess.,	 UN	 Doc	 A/68/262	 (05.08.2013)	 paras	 15-18;	 M.	
Sekaggya,	 Report	 of	 the	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 the	 Situation	 of	 Human	 Rights	
Defenders,	UN	Doc	A/HRC/19/55	(21.12.2011),	paras	60-87,	124-126.		
	 The	chapter	will	 first	examine	each	of	 the	Amnesty	case	studies	 in	order	to	
document	 the	 state	 practice	 identified,	 and	 the	 gaps	 that	 need	 to	 be	 filled.	 The	
chapter	 will	 then	 consider	 the	 work	 of	 the	 International	 Law	 Commission	 in	 its	
progressive	codification	of	the	law	on	prevention	and	loss	allocation	with	respect	to	


















so	 given	 the	 horrific	 events	 and	 failure	 of	 satisfactory	 legal	 remedy	 and	
accountability.10	On	December	 2,	 1984,	 toxic	 gas	 leaked	 from	 a	methyl	 isocyanate	
(MIC)	 storage	 tank	 at	 the	 Union	 Carbide	 India	 Limited	 (UCIL)	 pesticide	
manufacturing	plant	in	Bhopal,	India.	Majority-owned	by	United	States-based	Union	
Carbide	Corporation	(UCC),	the	UCIL	plant	had	been	built	in	1968	close	to	“densely	
populated	 slum	 areas”	 which	 expanded	 over	 the	 years	 to	 accommodate	 rural	
migrants.11	According	to	Amnesty,	the	leak	was	responsible	for	the	death	of	between	




from	Hazardous	Activities,	Report	of	 the	 International	 Law	Commission:	 Fifty-third	
Session,	UN	Doc	A/56/10	(2001)	366-436.		
9	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	COMMISSION,	Draft	Principles	on	the	Allocation	of	Loss	in	the	Case	
of	 Transboundary	 Harm	 Arising	 from	 Hazardous	 Activities,	 Report	 of	 the	
International	Law	Commission:	Fifty-eighth	Session	UN	Doc	A/61/10	 (2006)	101-
182.		
10	In	 addition	 to	 AMNESTY	 INTERNATIONAL,	 above	 n	 1,	 see	 the	 extensive	 writings	 of	
Upendra	 Baxi	 on	 Bhopal.	 See,	 for	 example,	 <http://upendrabaxi.in/	 >	 accessed	
26.05.2017.	
11	AMNESTY	INTERNATIONAL,	above	n	1,	33.	
and	 debilitating	 illnesses”	 with	 consequences	 felt	 still	 today.12	While	 evidence	
suggests	management	at	UCC	had	been	aware	of	safety	problems	at	the	Bhopal	plant	
for	 years,	 cost-cutting	 measures	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 local	 laws	 relating	 to	 hazardous	
industries	 combined	 to	 create	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 no	 comprehensive	 emergency	
plans	existed	to	warn	the	local	communities	about	what	to	do	in	the	event	of	a	leak,	
even	 though	such	plans	were	 in	effect	at	a	comparable	Union	Carbide	plant	 in	 the	
United	States.13	Moreover,	the	withholding	of	timely	and	accurate	information	with	







settlement	 was	 reached	 in	 India	 after	 US	 courts	 dismissed	 actions	 brought	 by	
victims	 and	 consolidated	 into	 one	 claim	 brought	 by	 India,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	






15	The	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 India	 upheld	 the	 civil	 settlement	 and	 civil	 immunity	
granted	 in	 the	settlement,	but	quashed	 the	decision	 to	grant	criminal	 immunity	 in	
Union	Carbide	Corporation	v	Union	of	 India,	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 India	 (1991)	 4	 SCC	
584;	AIR	1992	SC	248.	
16	AMNESTY	 INTERNATIONAL,	 above	 n	 1,	 43-46.	 The	 Union	 of	 India	 v	 Union	 Carbide	
Corporation,	US	Southern	District	Court	of	New	York,	8	April	1985,	 reproduced	 in	
APPEN	Report,	The	Bhopal	Tragedy:	One	Year	After	 (Sahabat	Alam	Malaysia	 1985)	





grounds	 of	 forum	non	conveniens	 by	 Judge	Keenan	who	 held	 that	 his	 analysis	 and	
conclusions	from	1986	decision	were	still	appropriate.	 In	November	1999	a	group	
of	 victims	 filed	 a	 suit	 under	 the	Alien	Tort	 Claims	Act	 against	UCC	 and	 its	 former	
CEO,	Warren	Anderson.	This	claim	was	dismissed	by	Judge	Keenan	on	the	grounds	
that	the	plaintiffs	lacked	standing	and	because	proceedings	were	barred	by	the	1989	
settlement,	 see	Bano	v	Union	Carbide	Corporation,	 273	 F3d	 120	 (2d	 Cir.	 2001).	 In	
November	 2004,	 claims	 were	 filed	 against	 UCC	 and	 its	 former	 CEO,	 Warren	
Anderson	 for	 damage	 arising	 from	 alleged	 water	 pollution	 caused	 by	 the	 Bhopal	
plant	and	were,	again,	dismissed	by	Judge	Keenan,	Sahu	v	Union	Carbide	Corporation	
2006	WL	3377577	(SDNY	20.11.2006)	No	04	Civ	8825	(JFK),	reinstated	by	the	Court	
of	 Appeal	 on	 technical	 grounds,	 Sahu	 v	 Union	 Carbide	 Corporation,	 2012	 WL	
2422757	(SDNY	26.06.2012)	(No	04	Civ	8825	(JFK)),	and	ultimately	dismissed	again	
finally	handed	down	against	UCIL	and	seven	accused,	but	not	against	UCC	or	Warren	
Anderson,	 the	 chairman	 of	 UCC	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 disaster,	 who	 was	 previously	
declared	 an	 absconder	 and	 subject	 to	 an	 extradition	 request.17	Notably,	 the	 civil	
settlement	 agreement	 provided	 that	 if	 it	 was	 insufficient	 to	 address	 the	 costs	 of	
personal	injuries	and	compensation,	the	government	of	India	would	be	responsible	
for	 any	 shortfall.18	However,	 as	 noted	 by	Amnesty,	 “the	 settlement	 agreement	 did	
not	take	into	account	damages	for	environmental	pollution	generated	by	the	plant’s	
operations.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 award	was	 not	 calculated	 to	 cover	 or	 compensate	 for	
damage	 to	 the	 environment,	 life,	 health	 or	 property	 resulting	 from	 plant	
contamination.”19				
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 the	 economic	 settlement	 and	 its	 fraught	
implementation	process,	the	Amnesty	report	highlights	the	ongoing	health	effects	of	
the	 gas	 leak	 and	 the	 ongoing	 environmental	 pollution	 at	 Bhopal,	 including	
groundwater	 contamination.20	As	 yet	 unresolved	 civil	 claims	 for	 environmental	
damage	and	clean	up	have	been	brought	 in	US	courts	and	public	 interest	 litigation	
commenced	 in	 Indian	 courts.21	Meanwhile,	 UCC	 divested	 from	 UCIL,	 and	 was	




The	 Omai	 mine	 tailings	 dam	 rupture	 is	 much	 less	 well	 known	 than	 the	
Bhopal	gas	plant	disaster,	although	the	Canadian	case	law	emerging	out	of	the	failed	
attempt	to	litigate	against	Canadian-based	Cambior	Inc.	was	the	subject	of	detailed	
analysis	 in	 a	 paper	 published	 by	 the	 author	 in	 1999.23	Omai	 Gold	 Mines	 Limited	
																																																																																																																																																																					
by	 Judge	 Keenan,	 Sahu	v	Union	Carbide	Corporation	 No	 04	 Civ	 8825	 (JFK)	 (SDNY	
2012).	
17	AMNESTY	 INTERNATIONAL,	 above	 n	 1,	 41-42.	 State	 of	 Madhya	 Pradesh	 v	 Warren	








including	 the	 government	 of	 India,	 the	 Madhya	 Pradesh	 state	 government,	 UCC,	
Eveready	(formerly	UCIL)	and	Dow.	The	plaintiffs	seek	damages	of	US$3.3	billion	for	







the	 government	 of	 Guyana,	 established	 to	 operate	 OGML	 in	 accordance	 with	 a	
Mineral	 Agreement	 and	 accompanying	 Environmental	 Impact	 Statement	 (EIS).24		
OGML	began	operations	in	1993,	and	in	August	1995,	the	banks	of	its	tailings	dam	
ruptured	and	collapsed,	spewing	effluent	laced	with	cyanide	and	heavy	metals	into	
the	 Omai	 and	 then	 Essequibo	 rivers.25	Indigenous	 Guyanese	 villagers	 who	 relied	
upon	 the	 Essequibo	 River	 for	 “transport,	 food	 harvesting	 and	 subsistence	 fishing,	
drinking	 water,	 animal	 husbandry,	 irrigation,	 bathing	 and	 recreation”	 noticed	
changes	 in	 the	river	 including	scores	of	dead	 fish,	and	stopped	using	 the	water	or	
consuming	the	fish	even	before	being	notified	of	the	problem.26	It	took	5	days	for	the	
spill	 to	 be	 contained,	 and	 3	 days	 for	 official	 government	 notification	 of	 the	
environmental	disaster.27	Yet,	shortly	thereafter	the	government	declared	the	water	





The	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 spill	 in	 fact	 impacted	 people’s	 health	 has	 been	
controversial,	due	in	part	to	conclusions	of	a	Guyanese	government	Commission	of	
Inquiry	to	the	effect	that	“there	had	been	no	serious	risks	to	the	health	of	riverian	
communities.”30	Yet	 community	 concerns	 about	 water	 quality	 persisted	 due	 to	 a	
lack	of	government	environmental	monitoring	coupled	with	a	lack	of	assessment	of	
health	 effects.31	While	 the	 mine	 was	 allowed	 to	 resume	 operations	 under	 new	
environmental	 protection	 legislation,	 the	 Amnesty	 report	 highlights	 the	 lack	 of	
governmental	financial	and	technical	capacity	to	effectively	regulate	compliance.32		
	
Immediately	 after	 the	 spill,	 Cambior	 offered	 very	 small	 amounts	 of	
compensation	 to	 some	 affected	 people	 as	 full	 and	 final	 settlement	 of	 OGML’s	
liability.33	These	 settlements	were	 criticized	 as	 inadequate	 and	 unjust	 as	many	 of	
those	who	signed	were	illiterate	and	had	not	received	legal	advice.34	A	class	action	
lawsuit	 was	 commenced	 in	 Canadian	 courts	 in	 1997	 on	 behalf	 of	 an	 estimated	












The	Montreal	Gazette,	 09.09.1995;	R	RAMRAJ,	 ‘The	Omai	disaster	 in	Guyana’	 (2001)	
43:2	Geographical	Bulletin	88.	
34	Ibid.	










and	Golder	associés	ltée,	corespondents	[1998]	QJ	No	 2554,	Québec	 Super	 Ct	 (Class	
Action),	14.08.1998.	See	analysis	of	this	decision	in	SL	SECK,	above	n	23.		
36	AMNESTY	 INTERNATIONAL,	above	n	1,	76-78.	 In	August	1998	an	action	on	behalf	of	
23,000	 riverian	 Guyanese	 was	 brought	 against	 Cambior,	 OGML	 and	 others.	 The	
plaintiffs	 sought	 compensation	 of	 around	 US$150million	 and	 injunctions	 to	 (1)	
prevent	 the	 defendants	 from	 discharging	 further	 cyanide	 and	 other	 heavy	metals	
into	the	rivers;	(2)	to	direct	the	defendants	to	remediate	the	damage	caused	by	the	
1995	spill,	and	(3)	to	provide	the	residents	with	reliable	supplies	of	potable	water.	




leaving	 OGML	 as	 the	 sole	 defendant.	 The	 action	 against	 OGML	was	 dismissed	 12	
February	2002	by	the	Guyana	High	Court	with	no	written	reasons	provided.	See,	for	
example,	 INTERNATIONAL	 HUMAN	 RIGHTS	 CLINIC,	 ‘All	 that	 Glitters:	 Gold	 Mining	 in	
Guyana:	The	 failure	of	government	oversight	and	 the	human	rights	of	Amerindian	
communities’	 (March	 2007)	 Human	 Rights	 Program,	 Harvard	 Law	 School,	 39.	 A	
second	case	was	brought	against	Cambior,	OGML,	Golden	Star	Resources	and	others	
in	 the	 Guyanese	 courts	 in	 May	 2003.	 The	 plaintiffs	 sought:	 (1)	 US$2	 billion	 in	
damages;	 (2)	 injunctions	 ordering	 the	 defendants	 to	 provide	 potable	 water	 and	
meet	 the	 costs	 of	 medical	 monitoring	 of	 the	 Essequibo	 population;	 (3)	 the	
discontinuation	of	effluent	dumping	into	the	rivers;	(4)	various	measures	to	ensure	
that	 improved	management	 and	 contingency	plans	were	put	 in	place	 at	 the	mine;	
and	(5)	US$1	billion	in	punitive	damages.	The	case	was	dismissed	in	October	2006	
with	 no	written	 reasons	 provided.	 Justice	 Carl	 Singh	 provided	 a	 verbal	 judgment	
articulating	 the	 finding	 the	 representative	 nature	 of	 the	 suit	 “inappropriate”	 and	
“bad	 in	 law”	 and	 ruling	 that	 the	 residents	 did	 not	 share	 common	 interest.	 Judith	
David,	 Richard	 Bowens,	 and	 Lilmattie	 v.	 Cambior	 Inc,	 Golder	 associés	 ltée	 and	
Associates,	Home	Insurance,	and	Omai	Gold	Mines	Limited,	Knight	Piesold,	Golden	Star	






into	 a	 river	 over	 the	 course	 of	 thirty	 years.	 Australia’s	 Broken	 Hill	 Proprietary	
Company	 Limited	 (BHP)	was	 the	majority	 owner	 and	 operator	 of	Ok	Tedi	Mining	
Limited	 (OTML),	 and	 the	 mine	 was	 one	 of	 Papua	 New	 Guinea	 (PNG)’s	 most	
important	 contributors	 to	 the	 economy.38	However,	 while	 the	 original	 mining	
agreement	 provided	 that	 waste	 was	 to	 be	 stored	 in	 a	 tailings	 dam,	 OTML	 was	
allowed	to	operate	without	one	after	a	landslide	destroyed	the	dam’s	foundations	in	
1984	 while	 it	 was	 under	 construction.39	The	 ongoing	 riverine	 waste	 disposal	






30,000	 indigenous	 villagers,	 while	 other	 claims	 were	 filed	 in	 PNG	 courts.42	This	
Australian	 litigation	 was	 also	 the	 subject	 of	 detailed	 analysis	 in	 the	 1999	 article	
published	 by	 the	 author.43	Notably,	 the	 remedy	 sought	 included	 not	 only	 civil	
damages	for	the	destruction	of	subsistence	livelihoods,	but	also	court	orders	to	stop	
further	 dumping	 and	 to	 construct	 a	 tailings	 dam.44	Claims	 based	 on	 nuisance	 and	
trespass	 were	 dismissed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 Mozambique	 principle	 according	 to	
which	 courts	 do	 not	 have	 jurisdiction	 to	 hear	 cases	 relating	 to	 foreign	 property	
rights,	 while	 other	 claims	 were	 dismissed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 other	 doctrines.45	
Ultimately,	 some	 claims	 did	 proceed,	 although	 only	 those	 for	 which	 a	 damages	
remedy	 could	 be	 ordered.46	Notably,	 while	 forum	non	conveniens	was	 argued,	 the	










Tedi	 Mining	 Limited;	 No	 6861	 of	 1994	 Baat	 Ambetu	 and	 Others	 v	 The	 Broken	 Hill	
Proprietary	 Company	 Limited	 (CAN	 004	 028	 077)	 and	 Ok	 Tedi	 Mining	 Limited;	





Companhia	de	Moçambique	 [1893]	A	C	1	602.	The	Dagi	 case	was	dismissed	on	 the	












villagers,	 provide	 an	 equity	 share	 in	 the	 mine	 in	 trust	 for	 local	 communities,	
consider	rehabilitation	measures,	and	implement	a	tailings	containment.49	However,	
subsequent	 studies	 of	 the	 environmental	 impact	 of	 the	mine	 led	BHP	 to	 conclude	
that	 these	 would	 be	 greater	 than	 predicted	 and	 mitigation	 measures	 would	 be	
unsuccessful.50	As	the	PNG	government	wanted	to	keep	the	mine	open,	BHP	began	
to	 divest	 from	 the	 mine,	 and	 secured	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	 PNG	 government	
granting	 it	 immunity	 from	 further	 liabilities	 even	 as	 OTML	 decided	 against	
implementation	 of	 a	 tailings	 containment	 system.51	Under	 the	 agreement,	 BHP	
transferred	 all	 its	 shares	 to	 a	 Singaporean	 company	 (the	 PNG	 Sustainable	
Development	 Program	 Limited)	 in	 2002. 52 	Meanwhile,	 Community	 Mine	
Continuation	 Agreements	 offering	 compensation	 packages	 were	 signed	 between	




49	Ibid	 87.	 The	 agreement	 was	 codified	 as	 Mining	 (Ok	 Tedi	 Restated	 Eighth	
Supplemental	Agreement)	Act	1995	in	PNG.	Under	the	agreement	BHP	agreed	to	pay	
around	US$86	million	to	affected	villagers	along	the	river	and	an	additional	US$31	
to	 those	 most	 severely	 affected	 in	 the	 lower	 OK	 Tedi	 river	 area.	 Under	 the	
agreement	plaintiffs	retained	the	right	to	recommence	 legal	action	 in	the	Supreme	
Court	 of	 Victoria	 with	 regards	 to	 any	 dispute	 related	 to	 the	 settlement.	 The	 PNG	
government	 further	 passed	 the	 Compensation	 (Prohibition	 of	 Foreign	 Legal	




51	Ibid.	 In	 April	 2000,	 two	 new	 actions	 were	 brought	 in	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	
Victoria	against	BHP	and	OTML	seeking	to	enforce	commitments	made	in	the	Eighth	
Supplemental	Agreement,	 which	 had	 allegedly	 not	 been	 honoured,	 specifically	 the	












OTML	 and	 removing	 all	 legal	 liability	 limits	 against	 BHP	 (now	 BHP	 Billiton).55	In	





the	 Amnesty	 report,	 as	 the	 transnational	 character	 here	 is	 not	 the	 transfer	 of	
potentially	 hazardous	 industrial	 technology,	 but	 rather	 the	 direct	 transfer	 of	 the	




hazardous	waste”	 that	 had	 been	 contracted	 to	 dispose	 of	 the	waste	 by	 Trafigura,	
“the	world’s	third	largest	independent	trader	of	crude	and	oil	products.”58	According	
to	Amnesty,	 the	contract	called	 for	Compagnie	Tommy	to	“discharge”	 the	waste	 in	
an	 “open	 dumpsite	 for	 domestic	 waste,	 located	 in	 a	 poor	 residential	 district	 of	
Abidjan”	with	 “no	 facilities	 for	 storing	 or	 processing	 hazardous	waste.”59		Nor	 did	
the	contract	call	for	any	such	treatment.		
	
Trafigura	 had	 purchased	 coker	 naphtha	 from	 a	 Mexican	 state-owned	
petroleum	company,	and	used	a	process	of	caustic	washing	to	refine	it,	which	took	
place	 on	 board	 the	 Probo	 Koala	 in	 the	 Mediterranean,	 a	 ship	 chartered	 by	


















According	 to	 Amnesty,	 people	 living	 or	 working	 near	 the	 waste	 sites	 in	
Abidjan	 experienced	 symptoms	 ranging	 from	 nosebleeds	 and	 vomiting	 to	 skin	
lesions	and	respiratory	problems	that	were	found	by	the	World	Health	Organization	
to	 be	 consistent	 with	 exposure	 to	 this	 type	 of	 waste.62		 At	 least	 100,000	 people	
sought	 treatment	 at	 health	 facilities	 while	 others	 sought	 traditional	 healers	 or	
received	 no	 treatment	 at	 all	 (the	 elderly).	 While	 the	 government	 provided	 free	
medical	 treatment	 for	 thousands,	 Trafigura	 never	 made	 public	 full	 information	
about	the	exact	composition	of	the	waste,	and	disputes	the	possibility	that	it	could	
cause	 long-term	consequences.63		The	government	 took	 initial	steps	 to	remove	the	
waste	 and	 clean	 it	 up,	 yet	 sources	 including	 Amnesty	 have	 documented	 that	 the	
decontamination	 process	 was	 not	 complete	 despite	 settlement	 money	 paid	 by	
Trafigura	that	was	designated	for	this	purpose.64		
	
	 A	National	Commission	of	Enquiry	 concluded	 that	 there	had	been	 systemic	
failings	 of	 Ivorian	 institutions,	 including	 enforcement	 of	 licence	 requirements,	 but	
also	 that	 there	were	 clearly	 failings	of	 corporate	actors	 and	 individuals	who	must	
have	known	of	the	 inability	of	Compagnie	Tommy	to	safely	dispose	of	the	waste.65	
Criminal	 prosecutions	 were	 brought	 against	 various	 individuals	 in	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	
courts.	However,	a	settlement	agreement	entered	into	between	the	government	and	
Trafigura	 provided	 immunity	 to	 all	 members	 of	 Trafigura,	 including,	 in	 practice,	
individual	 Trafigura	 executives	 and	 employees	 who	 had	 been	 charged	 criminally	







65	Ibid	 101.	 Republic	 of	 Côte	 d’Ivoire,	National	Commission	of	Enquiry	on	 the	 toxic	
waste	in	the	district	of	Abidjan,	15.11.2006.	
66	AMNESTY	INTERNATIONAL,	above	n	1,	102.		In	September	2006,	State	prosecutors	in	
Côte	 d’Ivoire	 brought	 criminal	 charges	 against	 a	 number	 of	 individuals	 alleged	 to	
have	been	 involved	 in	 the	dumping	of	 the	 toxic	waste.	The	accused	 included	 local	
port	and	customs	officials,	employees	of	local	companies	implicated	in	the	dumping,	
and	the	CEO	and	two	employees	of	the	Trafigura	Group.	Yao	Essaie	Motto	&	Others	v	
Trafigura	 Limited	 and	 Trafigura	 Beheer	 BV,	 High	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 Queen’s	 Bench	
Division,	 Claim	 No	 HQ06X03370.	 The	 government	 of	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	 Trafigura	
reached	 a	 settlement,	 the	 Protocol	 of	 agreement	 (Protocole	 d’accord)	 between	 the	
State	of	Côte	d’Ivoire	and	the	Trafigura	Parties,	 13.02.2007,	which	effectively	ended	
all	actions	in	the	Côte	d’Ivoire	against	members	of	Trafigura.	
67	AMNESTY	 INTERNATIONAL,	 above	 n	 1,	 102-103.	 Salomon	 Ugborugbo	 (head	 of	
Compagnie	Tommy)	and	Essoin	Kouao	(shipping	agent	 from	WAIBS	(West	African	
International	 Business	 Services),	 the	 port	 agent	 used	 by	 Trafigura	 who	 had	
recommended	 Compagnie	 Tommy)	 were	 ultimately	 convicted	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
incident.	Arrêt	No	14	du	22/10/2008,	Cour	d’Assises,	Cour	d’Appel	Abidjan.		
	 The	 settlement	 agreement	 was	 entered	 into	 in	 2007,	 before	 a	 full	
determination	had	been	made	of	the	number	of	victims	and	the	nature	of	the	harm,	
and	without	prior	consultation	with	victims.	The	amount	was	US$200	million,	and	it	
was	 intended	 for	 compensation	and	 clean-up	 costs,	with	Côte	d’Ivoire	 agreeing	 to	
compensate	 the	 victims	 and	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	 any	 future	 claims.68	Yet	 the	
method	 of	 distributing	 the	 compensation	 has	 been	 critiqued	 for	 failing	 to	 include	





courts	 resulted	 in	 a	 2009	US$49	million	 settlement	 agreement	 between	Trafigura	
and	30,000	claimants.70	Terms	of	the	settlement	included	that	Trafigura	would	not	
admit	 liability,	 the	 law	 firm	would	 not	 bring	 any	 further	 claims	 against	 Trafigura	
relating	 to	 the	waste,	 and	 confidentiality	was	 imposed	 upon	 independent	 experts	














€1	million	 fine	 imposed	 on	 TBBV,	many	 of	which	were	 appealed,	 an	 out-of-court	
settlement	was	 reached	ending	all	 legal	proceedings	 that	obliged	TBBV	 to	pay	 the	










75	Ibid.	 The	 Dutch	 Court	 of	 First	 Instance	 found	 TBBV,	 Naeem	Ahmed	 (a	 London-
based	 employee	 of	 Trafigura	 Ltd),	 and	 Captain	 Chertov	 guilty.	 See	 Amnesty	
International	 English	 translation	 of	 verdict	 on	Trafigura	Beheer	BV,	 LJN	 (National	
Case	Law	Number):	BN2149,	District	Court	of	Amsterdam,	13/846003-06	(PROMIS),	
23.07.2010.	The	Court	of	appeal	annulled	the	verdict	against	Naeem	Ahmed	in	July	





	 In	 sum,	 the	 case	 studies	 presented	 in	 Amnesty’s	 Injustice	 Incorporated	
illustrate	 that	 environmental	 contamination	 issues	 may	 feature	 prominently	 in	
relation	 to	 transnational	 corporate	 human	 rights	 violations,	 and,	 while	 host	 and	
home	 state	 practice	 has	 emerged	 attempting	 to	 address	 remedy	 for	 victims,	 this	
practice	 is	 sporadic	and	 inadequate.	The	rights	violated	 in	 these	examples	 include	
rights	of	local	peoples	to	health,	food,	water,	livelihood,	and	a	clean	environment.78	
However,	home	and	host	states	have	failed	at	working	cooperatively	to	meet	their	
obligations	 to	 provide	 access	 to	 effective	 remedy	 for	 victims.	 These	 failures	 have	
been	 compounded	by	 allegations	of	 corruption	at	multiple	 levels	 that	 inhibit	 both	
the	awarding	of	compensation	in	the	first	place	and	its	delivery	once	awarded.79		
	
The	 case	 studies	 also	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 question	 of	 rectifying	
doctrines	such	as	the	much	criticized	common	law	doctrine	of	forum	non	conveniens.	
As	 the	 Ok	 Tedi	 litigation	 in	 particular	 illustrates,	 even	 where	 home	 state	 courts	
accept	 jurisdiction	 over	 a	 case	 and	 a	 settlement	 is	 reached,	 clean	 up,	 justice	 and	
accountability	may	still	be	out	of	reach.	Ultimately,	Injustice	Incorporated	identifies	
three	 major	 obstacles	 to	 remedy:80	(a)	 “extraterritorial”	 legal	 issues,	 such	 as	
separate	legal	personality,	limited	liability,	and	jurisdictional	hurdles;	(b)	corporate	
control	over	 information	 leading	to	a	 lack	of	access	to	 information	by	victims;	and	






Public	 Prosecutor.	 All	 legal	 proceedings	were	 ended	 in	November	 2012	when	 the	
Dutch	Public	Prosecutor	and	TBBV,	Claude	Dauphin	and	Naeem	Ahmed	 reached	a	
settlement.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 ruling	 obliging	 TBBV	 to	 pay	 the	 €1	
million	 fine	 became	 final.	 In	 addition,	 the	 settlement	 provided	 for	 TBBV	 to	 pay	 a	






Independent	 Expert	 on	 the	 Issue	 of	 Human	 Rights	 Obligations	 Relating	 to	 the	







The	work	of	 the	 International	Law	Commission	 (ILC)	will	 be	 the	 subject	of	
attention	in	this	part.81	In	1947,	the	UN	General	Assembly	established	the	ILC	with	
the	mandate	to	"initiate	studies	and	make	recommendations	for	the	purpose	of	[...]	
encouraging	 the	 progressive	 development	 of	 international	 law	 and	 its	
codification".82	The	 ILC	 has	 since	 that	 time	 issued	many	 reports	 and	 studies	 that	
have	been	 considered	 influential	 by	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice,	whether	 or	
not	they	codify	or	progressively	develop	customary	international	law,	and	has	also	
prepared	 draft	 treaties	 for	 “[m]any	 of	 the	 most	 important	 international	
conventions.”83	Importantly,	 the	 ILC	 has	 considered	 analogous	 issues	 to	 those	 of	











82	Ibid.	The	 ILC	was	 created	 in	accordance	with	Art	13(1)(1)	of	 the	Charter	of	 the	
United	Nations.		
83	See	 generally	 MN	 SHAW,	 International	 Law,	7th	 ed,	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	
2014,	 pp	 84-86;	 A	 BOYLE	 and	 C	 CHINKIN,	 The	Making	of	 International	Law,	 Oxford	
University	Press,	2007,	especially	pp	171-204.	Boyle	and	Chinkin	note	that	the	ILC	




84 	‘State	 Responsibility’	 in	 Summaries	 of	 the	 Work	 of	 the	 International	 Law	
Commission	<http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/9_6.shtml>	accessed	26.05.2017.	
85	International	 Law	 Commission,	 Draft	 Articles	 on	 Responsibility	 of	 States	 for	





Reports	1997,	7,	paras	47,	79,	83.	The	 ICJ	 further	commented	 in	Application	of	the	
Convention	 on	 the	 Prevention	 and	 Punishment	 of	 the	 Crime	 of	 Genocide	 (Bosnia	 v.	
Serbia)	ICJ	Reports	2007,	7,	para	420,	that	Art	16	of	DARS	dealing	with	coercion	of	a	
scholars	frequently	cite	DARS	Article	8	for	the	proposition	that	the	conduct	of	non-
state	actors,	 including	businesses,	 cannot	be	directly	attributed	 to	 the	state	unless	
the	 business	 was	 acting	 under	 the	 “instructions	 of,	 or	 under	 the	 direction	 and	
control	of”	that	state	(the	effective	control	test).87	Contested	interpretations	of	this	
and	 related	 Articles	 that	 raise	 the	 possibility	 of	 attribution	 of	 transnational	
corporate	 conduct	 to	 the	 state	 have	 received	much	 attention	 in	 the	 business	 and	
human	 rights	 literature,	 including	 Article	 5	 (agency),	 Article	 7	 (governmental	
authority),	 Article	 9	 (conflict	 zones),	 and	 Article	 11	 (adoption	 of	 conduct).88	As	 I	
have	 argued	 elsewhere,	 other	 Articles	 of	 DARS,	 are	 clearly	 relevant	 to	
conceptualizing	the	state	duty	to	protect,	including	Article	4	which	draws	attention	
to	the	conduct	-	both	actions	and	omissions	-	of	state	organs,	including	organs	of	the	







State	or	another	 international	organization	 is	reflective	of	customary	 international	
law.	
87	See	 generally	 SL	 SECK,	 ‘Conceptualizing	 the	 Home	 State	 Duty	 to	 Protect	 Human	
Rights’	 in	Karin	Buhman,	Mette	Morsing,	&	Lynn	Roseberry	(eds),	Corporate	Social	
and	 Human	 Rights	 Responsibilities:	 Global	 Legal	 and	 Management	 Perspectives,	
Palgrave	Macmillan,	 2011,	 pp25,	 39-40.	 For	 a	 small	 sample	 of	 sources	 see	 NMCP	
JÄGERS,	Corporate	Human	Rights	Obligations:	In	Search	of	Accountability,	Intersentia	
2002,	 pp	 169-72;	O	 DE	 SCHUTTER,	 ‘The	Accountability	 of	Multinationals	 for	Human	




88	SL	 SECK,	 above	 n	 87,	 pp	 39-42	 and	 sources	 cited.	 See	 also	 Art	 16	 (aiding	 or	




91	Principle	 25	 states:	 “As	 part	 of	 their	 duty	 to	 protect	 …	 States	 must	 take	
appropriate	 steps	 to	 ensure,	 through	 judicial,	 administrative,	 legislative	 or	 other	
appropriate	 means,	 that	 when	 such	 abuses	 occur	 within	 their	 territory	 and/or	
jurisdiction	those	affected	have	access	to	effective	remedy.”	UN	Guiding	Principles,	
Principle	 25,	 page	 22.	 While	 the	 scope	 of	 meaning	 of	 “jurisdiction”	 is	 clearly	
contested	 (and	 undermined	 by	 those	 who	 unnecessarily	 argue	 in	 favour	 of	
“extraterritorial”	 obligations),	 the	 reference	 in	 the	Commentary	 to	Principle	 25	 to	
National	Contact	Points	of	the	OECD	Guidelines	for	Multinational	Enterprises	clearly	
supports	an	interpretation	that	this	Principle	applies	to	home	states.	See	further	SL	
SECK,	 ‘Canadian	Mining	 Internationally	and	 the	UN	Guiding	Principles	 for	Business	
and	Human	Rights’	(2011)	49	Canadian	Yearbook	of	International	Law	51,	111-12.	
	
What	 has	 received	 far	 less	 attention	 in	 the	 business	 and	 human	 rights	
scholarly	 and	 advocacy	 communities	 is	 the	 parallel	 work	 undertaken	 by	 the	 ILC	
initially	conceptualized	as	International	Liability	for	Injurious	Consequences	arising	
out	 of	 Acts	 not	 Prohibited	 by	 International	 Law.	 Begun	 in	 the	 1970s,	 this	 plan	 of	
work	 was	 specifically	 designed	 to	 consider	 secondary	 rules	 for	 acts	 such	 as	
industrial	activities	 that	were	not	 in	 themselves	wrongful	under	 international	 law,	
but	 which	 could	 cause	 international	 harms	 such	 as	 transboundary	 pollution	
impacting	the	territory	of	another	state.92	This	approach	was	strongly	criticized	by	
many,	 including	 notably	 Professor	 Ian	 Brownlie	 who	 described	 this	 approach	 as	
“fundamentally	misconceived”	in	its	confusion	of	primary	and	secondary	rules,	and	
its	 failure	 to	 appreciate	 that	 “much	 of	 state	 responsibility	 […]	 is	 concerned	 with	
categories	of	lawful	activities	which	have	caused	harm.”93	
	
In	 1997,	 the	 ILC’s	 work	 on	 international	 liability	 was	 subdivided	 into	 two	
separate	streams,	one	on	the	Prevention	of	Transboundary	Damage	from	Hazardous	
Activities,	which	resulted	in	2001	in	draft	Articles	(Prevention	Articles);94	while	the	
other	 resulted	 in	 2006	 in	 draft	 Principles	 on	 the	Allocation	 of	 Loss	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Transboundary	 Harm	 arising	 out	 of	 Hazardous	 Activities	 (Loss	 Allocation	
Principles).95	These	 two	 bodies	 of	work	 are	 now	 considered	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	
codification	 of	 primary	 rules	 of	 international	 environmental	 law	 designed	 to	
address	transboundary	environmental	risk	management.96	However,	relegating	the	
relevance	of	this	body	of	work	to	the	environmental	arena	would	be	a	grave	mistake,	






Press	 1983,	 p	 50.	 See	 also	 A	 BOYLE	 and	 C	 CHINKIN,	 ibid,	who	 describe	 the	 original	
conceptualization	 as	 “fundamentally	 confused”	 and	 “extraordinary”	 in	 part	 for	
“appear[ing]	 to	 believe	 that	 no	 primary	 obligations	 of	 environmental	 protection	








97	See,	 for	 example,	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW	COMMISSION	 STUDY	GROUP,	 ‘Fragmentation	of	
International	 Law:	 Difficulties	 arising	 from	 the	 Diversification	 and	 Expansion	 of	
International	 Law’	 Report	of	 the	Study	Group	of	 the	 International	Law	Commission,	
finalized	by	Martti	Koskenniemi,	A/CN.4/L.682	and	Corr.1,	13.04.2006.	
	 As	I	have	discussed	elsewhere,98	the	kind	of	environmental	harms	identified	
in	 the	 second	and	 third	Amnesty	 case	 studies,	 if	not	 the	 first,	may	be	classified	as	
“intra-territorial”	problems	that,	 if	examined	through	the	 lens	of	Principle	2	of	 the	
1992	Rio	Declaration,99	fall	within	 the	 exclusive	 territorial	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 host	
state.	This	is	because	the	starting	point	of	Principle	2	is	the	sovereign	right	of	states	
to	exploit	their	natural	resources	in	accordance	with	their	own	environmental	and	





environmental	 regulation,	 the	 application	of	 standards	 and	management	practices	




as	 does	 the	 Amnesty	 Report,	 highlights	 that	 this	 interpretation	 of	 Principle	 11	 is	
fundamentally	 flawed.	 Local	 communities	 in	 host	 states	 anticipate	 that	
environmental	 standards	 applied	 by	 transnational	 corporations	 will	 be	 equally	
rigorous	wherever	 in	 the	world	 businesses	 operate.	 Environmental	 human	 rights	
include	 both	 procedural	 rights	 protections,	 and	 substantive	 rights	 protections,	 as	
well	 as	 additional	 protections	 for	 vulnerable	 groups. 103 	While	 substantive	
environmental	rights	that	may	be	classified	as	second	generation	social,	economic,	
and	 cultural	 rights,	 or	 third	 generation	 peoples	 rights, 104 	may	 arguably	 be	
interpreted	as	 requiring	progressive	realization	by	states,	 this	does	not	mean	 that	
businesses	with	a	responsibility	to	respect	human	rights	and	thus	to	do	no	harm	are	
off	 the	hook.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	precisely	when	states	are	 failing	 in	 their	duty	 to	protect	
human	rights	by	 failing	 to	pass	and	enforce	appropriate	regulatory	standards	 that	
the	business	responsibility	to	respect	rights	requires	businesses	to	go	beyond	strict	



















principle	 is	widely	understood	 to	 reflect	 customary	 international	 law,	although	 its	
precise	 meaning	 and	 scope	 are	 contested.	 The	 Principle	 arose	 initially	 out	 of	
international	 disputes	 such	 as	 the	 1930s	 Canada-United	 States	 international	
arbitration	 over	 air	 pollution	 arising	 from	 the	 Trail	 Smelter	 in	 British	 Columbia,	
Canada,	and	harming	farmers	in	the	United	States.105	According	to	Principle	2,	while	
engaging	in	activities	within	their	jurisdiction	or	control,	states	may	not	cause	harm	
to	 the	 territory	 of	 other	 states	 (transboundary	 harm)	 or	 areas	 beyond	 the	
jurisdiction	 of	 any	 state	 (global	 commons	 harm).	 This	 “do	 no	 harm”	 principle	 is	
generally	 understood	 as	 requiring	 the	 exercise	 of	 due	 diligence,106	and	 provides	 a	
basis	 for	 the	 ILC’s	 Prevention	 Articles	 and	 Loss	 Allocation	 Principles.	 An	
unanswered	question	is	whether	the	ILC’s	work,	and	the	do	no	harm	principle	more	
generally,	are	relevant	for	what	I	and	others	classify	as	“transnational	harm”	–	that	
is	 harm	 arising	 from	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 associated	 with	 the	 transfer	 of	
potentially	hazardous	industrial	technologies,	as	found	in	Amnesty	case	studies	1-3,	
as	well	as	 to	 the	actual	 transfer	of	 the	hazardous	substances,	as	 found	 in	Amnesty	
case	 study	 4,	 which	 can	 more	 easily	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 type	 of	 transboundary	
movement.107	While	 the	 ILC	 initially	 conceptualized	 transnational	 harm	 as	 falling	
within	 its	 plan	 of	 work,	 it	 was	 ultimately	 not	 explicitly	 included,	 and	 has	 been	
described	by	Shinya	Murase	as	having	“disappeared”	over	time.108	Despite	this,	the	





understood	 as	 limited	 to	 situations	 of	 physical	 border-crossing	 of	 hazardous	
substances	 causing	harm,	or	whether	 it	 should	also	 include	 the	border-crossing	of	





105	RM	 BRATSPIES	 and	 RA	 MILLER	 (eds),	 Transboundary	Harm	 in	 International	Law:	
Lessons	from	the	Trail	Smelter	Arbitration,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006.		
106 	J	 KNOX,	 ‘The	 Myth	 and	 Reality	 of	 Transboundary	 Environmental	 Impact	
Assessment’	(2002)	96:2	American	Journal	of	International	Law	291.	
107	SL	SECK,	above	n	4,	180-81.	
108	S	 MURASE,	 ‘Perspectives	 from	 International	 Economic	 Law	 on	 Transnational	
Environmental	Issues’	(1995)	Receuil	Des	Cours	287,	396-98.	
109 	SL	 SECK,	 Home	 State	 Obligations	 for	 the	 Prevention	 and	 Remediation	 of	




The	 ILC	 Prevention	 Articles	 were	 designed	 to	 address	 the	 “imperative	 for	
operators	 of	 hazardous	 activities	 to	 take	 all	 steps	 necessary	 to	 prevent	 harm.”111	
Article	1	provides	that	the	Prevention	Articles	apply	to	“activities	not	prohibited	by	





the	 territory	or	otherwise	under	 the	 jurisdiction	or	 control	of	which	 the	activities	
referred	to	in	draft	article	1	are	planned	or	are	carried	out.”114	Thus	the	scope	of	the	
Prevention	Articles	is	dependent	upon	understandings	of	“territory,”	“jurisdiction,”	
and	 “control,”	 among	 other	 terms.	 As	 I	 have	 analyzed	 in	 detail	 elsewhere,	 it	 is	
possible	to	argue	that	transnational	harm	associated	with	foreign	direct	investment	





The	 ILC	 Prevention	 Articles	 have	 been	 described	 as	 a	 codification	 of	 “pre-
existing	 law	 on	 transboundary	 risk	 management.”116	While	 not	 overly	 ambitious,	
they	nevertheless	provide	useful	 lessons	 for	a	possible	business	and	human	rights	
treaty.	Article	3	provides	that	the	state	of	origin	“shall	take	all	appropriate	measures	





“[M]anifested	 in	reasonable	efforts	by	a	State	 to	 inform	 itself	of	 factual	and	
legal	components	that	relate	foreseeably	to	a	contemplated	procedure	and	to	
take	appropriate	measures	in	a	timely	fashion,	to	address	them.	Thus	States	


















participation	 of	 the	 state	 likely	 to	 be	 affected	 is	 “indispensible”	 to	 enhancing	 the	
effectiveness	 of	 preventative	 action.121	This	 Article	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 promoting	
communication	 between	 home	 and	 host	 states.	 	 Articles	 5-7	 outline	 regulatory	
requirements	that	the	state	of	origin	must	implement.	These	include	requirements	
of	 prior	 authorization122	and	 prior	 assessment.123	Article	 8	 provides	 for	 timely	
notification	 of	 risk	 of	 the	 state	 likely	 to	 be	 affected,	 including	 transmission	 of	 all	
available	 technical	 and	 other	 relevant	 information.124	Articles	 9-13	 then	 provide	
procedures	 “essential	 to	 balancing	 the	 interests	 of	 all	 States	 concerned”,125	with	
factors	 to	consider	 listed	 in	Article	10,	and	a	requirement	 in	Article	12	 that	states	
exchange	information	concerning	the	proposed	activity.126	
	
Importantly,	 Article	 13	 contemplates	 that	 states	 shall	 provide	 the	 “public	
likely	to	be	affected”	with	the	“relevant	information	relating	to	[the]	activity,	the	risk	
involved,	 and	 the	 harm	 which	 might	 result	 and	 ascertain	 their	 views.”127	This	
obligation	 is	 applicable	 even	 if	 the	 public	 is	 beyond	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 state.128	
However,	Article	14	provides	a	narrow	exception	with	 regard	 to	national	 security	
and	 industrial	 secrets,	 including	 information	protected	by	 intellectual	 property.129		
Article	15	compliments	Article	13	by	requiring	that	access	to	justice	be	provided	in	
the	 courts	 of	 the	 state	 of	 origin,	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 non-
discrimination.130	However,	 the	 Prevention	 Articles	 do	 not	 impose	 a	 requirement	
that	a	judicial	remedy	or	other	procedure	be	in	place	for	state	nationals	in	the	first	
place	 and	 so	 this	 Article	must	 be	 distinguished	 from	 a	 true	 right	 of	 transnational	
access	 to	 justice.131	Thus,	 a	 state	would	be	 in	 compliance	with	 the	Article	15	non-
discrimination	principle	where	access	to	justice	is	simply	unavailable	to	anyone.	The	












129	Ibid	p	426.	However,	 the	 state	of	origin	 “shall	 cooperate	 in	good	 faith	with	 the	










due	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 Articles	 on	 State	 Responsibility	 and	 the	 Prevention	
Articles.133	The	 drafting	 process	 of	 the	 Loss	 Allocation	 Principles	 was	 politically	
charged	 due	 in	 part	 to	 state	 rejection	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 state	 liability,	 and	 the	
resulting	 “pure	 soft	 law”	 text	 has	 been	described	 as	 a	 “collective	 failure	 of	 nerve”	
rather	 than	 a	 “reasoned	 outcome.”134	They	 are	 nevertheless	 –	 or	 perhaps	 for	 this	
reason	–	useful	to	consider.	As	noted	above,	access	to	justice	is	contemplated	in	the	




of	 the	Prevention	Articles.135	“Victim”	 is	defined	as	 “any	natural	or	 legal	person	or	
State	 that	 suffers	 damage,”136	while	 “operator”	 is	 defined	 as	 “any	 person	 in	
command	or	control	of	the	activity	at	the	time	the	incident	causing	transboundary	
damage	 occurs.”137	According	 to	 Principle	 3,	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 Loss	 Allocation	
Principles	 is	 twofold:	 to	 “ensure	prompt	and	adequate	compensation	 to	victims	of	
transboundary	damage”	and	to	“preserve	and	protect	the	environment	in	the	event	
of	 transboundary	 damage,	 especially	 with	 regard	 to	 mitigation	 of	 damage	 to	 the	
environment	 and	 its	 restoration	 and	 reinstatement.”138	Accordingly,	 the	 Loss	
Allocation	Principles	 contemplate	 the	 imposition	of	 strict	 liability	 on	 the	 operator	
“or,	where	appropriate,	other	person	or	entity”,	although	liability	may	be	limited.139	
Principle	4	contemplates	that	measures	should	require	the	operator	or	other	entity	
to	 “establish	 and	 maintain	 financial	 security	 such	 as	 insurance,	 bonds	 or	 other	




and	 goes	 beyond	 the	 Prevention	 Articles	 by	 requiring	 States	 to	 “provide	 their	
																																																								
132	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	COMMISSION,	above	n	8,	p	429	(Art	16),	p	431	(Art	17).	
133	AE	 BOYLE,	 ‘Globalising	 Environmental	 Liability:	 the	 Interplay	 of	 National	 and	
International	 Law’	 (2005)	 17	 Journal	 of	 Environmental	 Law	 3,	 5;	 R	 LEFEBER,	









domestic	 judicial	 and	 administrative	 bodies	 with	 the	 necessary	 jurisdiction	 and	
competence	 and	 ensure	 that	 these	 bodies	 have	 prompt,	 adequate	 and	 effective	
remedies	available	in	the	event	of	transboundary	damage…”.141	Non-discrimination	
is	 then	 invoked	more	meaningfully	here,	and	without	prejudice	 to	victims	seeking	
remedies	 elsewhere,	 although	 states	 are	 also	 called	 upon	 to	 provide	 recourse	 to	
expeditious	 international	 claims	 settlement	 procedures.142	Principle	 7	 encourages	
states	 to	 conclude	 “specific	 global,	 regional	 or	 bilateral	 agreements”	 in	 respect	 of	
particular	categories	of	hazardous	activities,	including	with	them	arrangements	for	
industry	 and/or	 State	 funds	 to	 provide	 supplementary	 compensation.”143	Finally,	
Principle	 9	 provides	 that	 each	 state	 “should	 adopt	 the	 necessary	 legislative,	




Loss	 Allocation	 Principles,	 and	 the	 DARS.	 According	 to	 the	 Preamble	 of	 the	 Loss	
Allocation	 Principles,	 the	 Principles	 are	without	 prejudice	 to	 the	 rules	 relating	 to	
State	Responsibility,	and	a	claim	may	lie	under	those	rules	in	the	event	of	a	breach	of	
an	 obligation	 of	 prevention.145	The	 “basic	 understanding”	 of	 the	 Principles	 is	
described	 as	 the	need	 to	 adopt	 a	 “scheme	of	 allocation	 of	 loss,	 spreading	 the	 loss	
among	multiple	actors,	 including	as	appropriate	 the	State”,	with	a	 “central	 theme”	
being	 that	 each	 state	 has	 the	 freedom	 to	 choose	 “one	 option	 or	 the	 other	 in	
accordance	 with	 its	 particular	 circumstances	 and	 conditions.”146	As	 both	 the	
Prevention	Articles	and	Loss	Allocation	Principles	are	understood	as	primary	rules,	
state	responsibility	may	also	be	 invoked	“to	 implement	not	only	 the	obligations	of	
the	State	itself	but	also	the	civil	responsibility	or	duty	of	the	operator.”147	
	
While	 the	 Loss	Allocation	Principles	 have	 been	 criticised	 by	 some	 as	 being	
too	weak	and	not	sufficiently	reflective	of	existing	 international	 law	obligations,148	






145	Ibid	 p	 111	 and	 p	 114.	 This	 suggests	 that	 where	 a	 failure	 of	 prevention	 has	
occurred,	recourse	to	state	responsibility	is	in	order;	whereas	where	the	obligations	
of	prevention	have	been	complied	with	yet	damage	occurs	nonetheless,	recourse	to	






the	Transnational	Enforcement	 of	 Environmental	 Law	Committee’	 in	Report	of	the	
72nd	 Conference	 held	 in	 Toronto	 4-8	 June,	 2006,	 London,	 2006,	 p	 655.	 See	
comparative	analysis	of	the	ILA	Report	in	SL	SECK,	above	n	109,	pp	326-329.	
rights	 treaty.	 Several	 ideas	 are	 notable,	 perhaps	 especially	 that	 specific	 treaties,	





The	 Injustice	Incorporated	case	 studies	 demonstrate	 that	 there	 is	 no	 single	
cause	of	transnational	corporate	impunity,	but	rather	it	is	the	result	of	many	failings.	
The	challenge,	then,	 in	the	design	of	a	business	and	human	rights	treaty,	 is	how	to	




One	 key	 finding	 of	 the	 Amnesty	 case	 studies	 is	 that	 home	 and	 host	 states	
have	 failed	 to	work	 cooperatively	 to	meet	 their	 respective	 obligations	 to	 provide	
access	to	effective	remedy	for	victims.	Rather,	state	practice	has	been	both	sporadic	
and	 inadequate.	 In	 addition,	 as	 noted	 above,	 the	 Amnesty	 report	 concludes	 that	
“extraterritorial”	legal	issues	such	as	separate	legal	personality,	limited	liability,	and	




in	 the	 protection	 of	 environmental	 rights,	 including	 rights	 affected	 by	 climate	
change.149	Importantly,	 neither	 the	 ILC	 Prevention	 Articles	 nor	 the	 ILC	 Loss	
Allocation	Principles	conceptualize	the	solution	to	transboundary	harm	as	requiring	
“extraterritoriality”,	preferring	instead	to	speak	of	a	dual	responsibility	to	regulate	
in	 keeping	 with	 duties	 of	 international	 cooperation.	 The	 ILC	 Prevention	 Articles	
specifically	contemplate	that	the	state	of	origin	shall	regulate	the	industrial	activity	
at	 issue,	which,	 in	a	 case	of	 transboundary	border-crossing	pollution	harm,	would	
mean	the	state	where	the	industrial	activity	is	physically	located	is	to	regulate	in	a	
comprehensive	manner.150	Yet	both	the	ILC	Prevention	Articles	and	Loss	Allocation	
Principles	 also	 contemplate	 a	 regulatory	 role	 for	 the	 affected	 state,	 whether	 the	
provision	of	information	to	those	likely	to	be	affected	by	environmental	harm,151	or	
more	 comprehensively	 that	 each	 state	 adopt	 legislative,	 administrative,	 and	
regulatory	measures	necessary	to	 implement	the	Loss	Allocation	Principles.152	The	












the	 home	 state	 regulatory	 role	 as	 a	 demonstration	 of	 responsibility	 for	 existing	
transnational	relationships.	
	
A	 second	 lesson	 from	the	 ILC	and	environmental	 law	more	generally	 is	 the	
focus	 upon	 the	 responsibility	 of	 “operators”	 of	 hazardous	 activities,	 or,	 where	
appropriate,	other	persons	or	entities.153	This	language	gets	to	the	core	of	who	is	in	
control	 of	 the	 industrial	 activity,	 potentially	 overcoming	 issues	 of	 separate	 legal	
personality	 of	 parent	 and	 subsidiary	 companies	 in	 appropriate	 cases.	Moreover,	 a	
focus	 on	 the	 operator	 of	 an	 activity	moves	 away	 from	 questions	 surrounding	 the	
types	 of	 businesses	 that	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 treaty	 obligation	 -	 for	 example,	 it	
would	 no	 longer	 appear	 relevant	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 business	 is	 a	 state-owned	
enterprise.154	A	 related	 issue	 is	 the	 concern	 over	 limited	 liability	 being	 used	 to	
restrict	the	ability	of	victims	to	seek	compensation	for	harm	by	insulating	the	parent	
company	from	liability.	Lessons	from	the	ILC	Loss	Allocation	Principles	highlight	the	
importance	of	 insurance	coverage	 for	hazardous	activities,	 as	well	 as	 the	need	 for	
supplementary	 industry	 funds. 155 	Regulations	 mandating	 adequate	 insurance	






Another	 concern	 raised	by	 the	 case	 studies	 is	 that	 of	 control	 over	 information	
with	regard	 to	 the	nature	of	hazardous	materials	being	used	and	 lack	of	access	 to	
information	by	victims	in	the	event	of	harm.	While	the	focus	of	the	Amnesty	report	
is	 upon	 the	 need	 for	 access	 to	 information	 in	 order	 to	 clean	 up	 and	 remedy	
environmental	and	health	harms,	the	ILC	Prevention	Articles	stress	the	importance	
of	 participatory	 processes	 in	 environmental	 decision-making,	 loosely	 in	 line	 with	
the	 three	 pillars	 of	 participatory	 environmental	 rights.156	The	 importance	 and	
content	of	these	rights	has	been	clarified	recently	by	Professor	Knox,	including	the	












human	 rights	defenders,	who	 face	 extraordinary	 risks.157	Again,	 a	 key	 lesson	 from	
the	 ILC	 is	 the	 importance	 of	 both	 home	 and	 host	 states	working	 cooperatively	 to	
ensure	 that	 procedural	 decision-making	processes	 are	 inclusive	before	operations	
begin,	 with	 information	 shared	 at	 an	 early	 stage,	 and	 processes	 put	 in	 place	 to	
ensure	 ongoing	 communication,	 oversight,	 and	 emergency	 preparedness	
throughout	 the	 lifecycle	of	a	project.158	In	 this	way,	problems	will	not	 fester	 (as	 in	
Ok	Tedi),	and	 if	or	when	accidents	happen	(as	 in	Bhopal,	Cambior),	processes	and	
relationships	 will	 exist	 to	 address	 problems	 without	 need	 of	 recourse	 to	 legal	
sanctions.	
	
An	 additional	 lesson	 arises	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 corporate-state	
relationships	 that	 impact	 the	 willingness	 and	 ability	 of	 states	 to	 uphold	 human	






residual	 role,	overcoming	challenges	 faced	by	host	 state	 capacity	 issues	as	well	 as	
host	state	reluctance	to	prosecute.	Having	said	this,	 the	Ok	Tedi	case	study	clearly	




Notably,	 Principle	 7	 of	 the	 Loss	 Allocation	 Principles	 specifically	 contemplates	
the	 importance	 of	 treaties	 being	 developed	 to	 address	 specific	 issues.	 Here	 it	 is	
worth	 revisiting	 the	 fourth	 Amnesty	 case	 study,	 the	 Trafigura	 case,	 which	 raises	
distinct	 issues	 for	 it	 concerns	 transboundary	 movements	 of	 hazardous	 wastes	
rather	than	transnational	movements	of	foreign	direct	investment	and	technologies.	
Curiously,	 and	 unlike	 the	 other	 three	 case	 studies,	 the	 problem	 that	 arose	 in	
Trafigura	is	already	subject	to	multilateral	environmental	agreements.	It	is	beyond	
the	scope	of	this	paper	to	provide	a	history	of	the	negotiations	and	controversy	over	











Hazardous	 Wastes	 and	 their	 Disposal.160	This	 history	 has	 been	 well	 documented	
elsewhere,	 including	 the	 concerns	 expressed	by	 countries	 of	 the	 global	 south	 that	
viewed	 the	 dumping	 of	 hazardous	 wastes	 in	 African	 countries	 as	 a	 crime	 and	
therefore	something	to	be	banned,	rather	than	something	that	should	be	subject	to	a	
notification	 and	 consent	 procedure	 as	 the	 one	 established	 in	 the	 Basel	
Convention.161	For	the	purpose	of	this	paper,	what	is	of	interest	is	that	in	addition	to	
the	 Convention	 itself,	 a	 Protocol	 on	 Liability	 and	 Compensation	 was	 successfully	
negotiated	and	adopted	 in	1999.162	However,	beyond	critiques	of	 the	 substance	of	





for	 states	 to	 develop	 national	 laws	 on	 liability	 and	 compensation,	 and	 to	 “more	
expeditiously”	develop	 “international	 law	regarding	 liability	and	compensation	 for	
adverse	 effects	 of	 environmental	 damage	 caused	 by	 activities	 within	 their	
jurisdiction	or	control	 to	areas	beyond	 their	 jurisdiction.”	Yet	states	have	 failed	 to	
do	 this	 in	many	 contexts,	 and	even	where	 they	have	negotiated	a	 treaty,	 a	 lack	of	
widespread	ratification	among	other	 issues	has	raised	concerns	that	these	treaties	





Moreover,	 even	 well-ratified	 and	 implemented	 treaties	 will	 not	 solve	
problems	 if	 not	 appropriately	designed.	A	different	problem	 identified	 in	 the	 case	
studies	 that	 is	not	addressed	by	either	 the	 ILC	Prevention	Articles	or	 the	 ILC	Loss	
Allocation	Principles	is	the	problem	of	corruption	at	multiple	levels,	inhibiting	both	
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the	 awarding	 of	 compensation	 and	 its	 delivery	 once	 awarded.	 This	 may	 be	
surprising	 given	 the	 prevalence	 of	 anti-corruption	 conventions.165	It	 is	 unclear,	
however,	 whether	 the	 explanation	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 implementation	 and	
enforcement	 of	 these	 state	 obligations	 has	 only	 recently	 begun	 to	 manifest	 in	
earnest,	 or	whether	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 conventions	misses	 the	 kinds	 of	 corruption	
experienced	by	human	rights	victims	seeking	access	to	remedy,	as	opposed	to	that	
facing	 business	 enterprises	 who	 seek	 a	 level	 playing	 field	 for	 commercial	
transactions.	Whatever	path	 is	 taken	 in	the	development	of	a	business	and	human	
rights	 treaty,	 the	 work	 of	 the	 ILC	 on	 the	 prevention	 and	 loss	 allocation	 of	
transboundary	 harm	 and	 related	 treaty	 developments	 provide	 insights	 into	 what	
may	be	possible,	and	what	may	be	required	for	an	effective	regime	to	prevent	and	
remedy	the	kinds	of	harms	highlighted	in	the	Amnesty	case	studies.		
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